Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector, and Firm Performance by Bonaventura, Luigi & Orlando, Danilo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular
Sector, and Firm Performance
Luigi Bonaventura and Danilo Orlando
Dipartimento di economia e metodi quantitativi - Universita` di
Catania
March 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14686/
MPRA Paper No. 14686, posted 16. April 2009 23:40 UTC
Enforcement of Regulation, Irregular Sector,
and Firm Performance
Luigi Bonaventura∗
Danilo Orlando†
very preliminary draft (May, 2007)
Abstract
In this paper we investigate how enforcement of regulation affects the
size of irregular sector, firm perfomance and the exit rate to the market.
Three kinds of enforcement policy will be tested in the model: control,
punish and legitimacy. The first policy is based on the number of inspec-
tors present in the economy; the second is defined by the magnitude of
punish; the third is measured by the social legitimacy. Our results show
the negligible influence of control to enforce irregularity; the strong ef-
fect of punish on irregular sector with a high exit rate; the good effect of
legitimacy policy in promoting regularity with a low output performance.
Keywords: Irregular sector, enforcement policies, exit rate, firm per-
fomance.
JEL classification: C63, E61, K42, O17
1 Introduction
This paper develops an agent-based model (abm) that sheds light on the evolu-
tion of the irregular sector. The irregular sector, which produces legal goods but
does not comply with official regulation, is a functioning part of all economies,
employing up to 60% of the workforce and producing nearly 40% of GDP1.
Throughout time, governments and international organizations have taken ac-
tions that affect the size of this sector. In 1998 the European Commission
proposed a formal document, on underground economy and off-the-books em-
ployment, to all the member countries. The main objectives of this document
were, on the one hand, the need of liberalizing the labour market, reducing fiscal
pressure and simplifing the tax system; on the other hand, an urge to increasing
control on regularity and respect for the institutions.
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Only a few countries, however, adopted an integrated policy of interven-
tion. In Italy, for instance, the only policies adopted were those concerning
incentive, with greater flexibility of the labour market regulations and fiscal
benefits. Two instruments in particular have been adopted over recent years:
realignment contracts in the law n.196/1997 and the Program for emersion in
the law n. 383/2001. These interventions were characterized by tax incentives,
deregulation of production activities, bonuses paid for cancellation of previous
tax debts, etc., without any enforcement action taking place at the same time.
The failure of the last Program for emersion is showed in the data of Labour
Minister: only 3854 irregular workers emerged that are about the 0.0008% ofthe
3.5 millions of irregular workers in Italy!
In the light of previous failures and the empirical evidence that shows an
increasing level of irregularity ratio in the Centre-South italian regions (table1);
a new policy was introduced in Italy in 2003 with the Biagi law reforming
the labour market. In particular, by means the d.lgs. n. 124/2004 a new
enforcement approach was adopted against the underground economy. Following
the UE directive, an increase in the level of control and the social promotion of
regulation legitimacy are proposed as the main instruments.
By means of a simulation model2 we propose to explain what is the impact
of enforcement on the size of irregular sector. In particular, we put to the test a
control policy based on the number of inspectors, an enforcement policy based
on the magnitude of sanctions, and, finally, a policy based on the level of social
legitimacy of regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the common
framework of the economic literature about the informal activity. Section 3
describes the model and its characteristics. In section 4 we present the analysis
of policy interventions and their effects on different regions. Section 5 concludes.
2 A framework for irregular behaviour
Economic literature on underground economy is based on a cost-benefit analysis
of individual behaviour. Generally, it represents the firm’s choice to operate
on an underground basis or in a regular economy, and how governments can
fight the phenomenon effectively.The literature offers two explanations of why
firms choose the underground sector, which, while not mutually exclusive, have
distinct policy implications.
First, firms may go underground when statutory tax rates are high and
other official regulations are onerous [De Soto 1989; Schneider and Enste 2000].
Cutting taxes and a process of deregulation are, according to this view, the
main ways to bring firms into the official economy. Second, the underground
economy may be due primarily to predatory behavior by government officials
[Kaufmann1994; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1998]. In this view
the problem that needs to be addressed is bureaucratic corruption.
2The simulation is written in Java. The code is available from the authors upon request.
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For all these explanations there is a common simple approach: firm receives
an economic benefit from irregularity. A reduction in taxation, lower production
costs and more flexibility in the labour market represent some of these benefits.
Every firm compares the benefits of irregular activity with the correspond-
ing expected costs. The costs of irregularity depend on the punishment level
and the probability of sanctions. This simple outline represents the theoretical
foundation of two alternative policies for government intevention. It is possible
to introduce a policy that reduces the benefits of irregular activity, and/or a
policy that increases the expected costs. The choice of the better policy mix
depends on the level of the resources locally needed for vigilance.
3 Model
Risk-adverse firms do business in a local economy system and might decide
to violate the official regulation and operate in the irregular economy. One
key difference between the regular and irregular sector is that regular sector is
taxed by the government, while irregular sector is only taxed when caught by
the authorities. The decision depends on the benefits that they would obtain
from doing so and the probability and magnitude of sanctions they would face
for the violation.
We define a set of heterogenous firms, i ∈ F ; a set of inspectors j ∈ I; a set
of available actions that a firm i can choice, ai ∈ A. In each period, every firm
receives a pay-off that depends on his choice and these of the other firms in the
neighbourhood V (i).
In particular, we assume that every firm has an individual level of benefit
(βi) with respect to irregular activity. The benefit is defined by two variables:
subjective and objective. The subjective cost’s variable (hi), measures the firm’s
internal costs of regulation. The other objective variable is determined globally
(i.e. is equal for all firms) and measures the level of legitimacy to regulation
(l). The individual level of βi is reduced by the number of inspectors in the
individual neighborhood V (i) and the magnitude of punishment (s).
The firm’s benefit level will be:
βi = [hi × (1− l)]−
[
s+ IV (i)
]
where:
h ∈ [0, 1], firm’s costs;
l ∈ [0, 1], level of legitimacy to regulation;
s ≥ 0, magnitude of punishment;
IV (i), number of inspectors in the firm’s neighbourhood.
Each firm calculates the risk of being sanctioned in every period. The risk
depends on the number of inspectors and irregular firms in its neighbourhood,
and the individual risk-aversion.
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Every firm calculates this value, as below:
risk = pi × r
where:
pi = 1− exp
[
k × IV (i)FV (i)
]
k is a constant that ensures a reasonable value with only one inspector and
one firm.
r∈ [0, 1], individual risk-aversion.
The behaviour of firms is determined by the difference between the benefit
and the risk of irregular activity. If the difference between the individual ben-
efit (β) and the risk is positive, the firm will become irregular, and viceversa,
if the difference is negative, it will operate in the regular economy. For every
period each firm can redefine its position, passing from a regular position to an
irregular one.
β − risk > 0⇒ irregular
β − risk ≤ 0⇒ regular
Regular and irregular sectors are modeled as producing a homogenous good
and their production methods are homogenous and employ solely capital.3 This
characteristic suggests the model many more accurately depict an industrialized,
rather than a developing, economy.
A production function is defined for the regular and irregular sector and the
distinguishing feature is the number of regular and irregular firms in the V (i)
of each firm. Firms production function will be as following defined:
Yi = f
(
ci,4FV (i)
)
where:
ci ∈ [0, 1], individual capital stock;
4FV (i) = Freg −Firr, the difference between the regular and irregular firms
on each firm neighbourhood V (i).
The form of the production Y (.) function is different for each firm and de-
pends on the regular or irregular sector and individual local conditions 4FV (i).
4FV (i) ≥ 0 4FV (i) < 0
Irregular Y (.) = c+ λ|4F | Y (.) = c+ φ|4F |
Regular Y (.) = c+ φ|4F | Y (.) = c− λ|4F |
3Typically, one finds irregular firms do not have access to capital markets and production
methods are much more labour intense than the regular sector (Thomas, 1992; Ihrig Moe,
2004)
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*with λ > φ output rates
An independent population of inspectors, with very simple characteristics,
moves around at random, seeking for irregular firms in his or her neighbourhood.
In each run, the inspector will randomly select a firm for punishment. The
sanction magnitude (s) is defined by the punish, representing a monetary fee to
pay reducing the production level. After the sanction the firm will go back into
the regular sector or, if the production level is equal to zero (Yi = 0), it will exit
to the market.
The following table shows the sequence of events of the model.
TABLE 1 - Sequence of events
Order Time Who What
1 0 Model Create firms
2 0 Model Create inspectors
3 1 Firms Choice sector
4 2 Inspectors Enforce
5 3 Firms Calculate output
4 Policy analysis
The empirical starting point of this analysis is shown by the following italian
regional situation. We will distinguish three different situations for each areas:
North, Centre and South. Three areas are distinguished for the number of
inspectors, number of firms and irregularity rate. The regulation legitimacy
index was indirectly set, given the irregularity rate, inspectors, firms and a
constant punish level. The following table 2 shows the benchmark situation for
each regional area.
TABLE 2: regional conditions (benchmark)
Regions irregularity (%) Inspectors Firms Inspectors/firms(%)
North 11,0 2670 2154484 0,123928
Centre 15,4 1947 894724 0,217609
South 22,4 2412 1186177 0,203342
Total Italy 13,4 7029 4235385 0,165959
Number of inspectors, with new assumptions in 2005. Source: Ministry of
Labour
Number of firms for regions. Source: ISTAT 2003.
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4.1 Punish
The test simulates the effects of an increase in the magnitude of punish (s) on the
irregularity and the exit ratio and output level. The following graphics 1 show
the impact of this enforcement policy in the different regions for a progressive
increasing (+5%) of punish magnitude.
graphic 1a - SOUTH -
graphic 1b - CENTRE -
graphic 1c - NORTH -
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The results show a positive effect on the irregularity ratio with just little
increasing of punish for all regions. With an increase of +25% of sanctions it
can be observed a reduction of irregularity of -12,5% in the South and equal to
zero in the other regions. It is important to note that we will might observe an
exit rate of about 15% in the South, 9% in the Centre and 6% in the North.
The output shows a positive aggregate dynamics.
4.2 Control
The test simulates the effects of an increase in the number of inspectors. The
following graphics 2 show the impact in the different regions for a progressive
increasing (+5%) of the number of inspectors, until its double value (+100%).
graphic 2a - SOUTH -
graphic 2b - CENTRE -
graphic 2c - NORTH -
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The simulation shows low effects of control increasing for all regions. Infact,
an increasing of 100% of inspectors does not reduce the irregularity ratio, but
shows an increasing exit rate. The aggregate output dynamics does not show
any positive trend. Briefly, for all italian regions, the simulation points out
to avoid the use of control policy to enforce the irregular sector. This result
suggests that it is advisable to avoid an exclusive control policy, and to contain
investments in this direction. It is important to note that control policies are
generally very expensive for administrations and their use should therefore be
limited.
4.3 Legitimacy
It is very difficult to define a direct correspondence between intervention poli-
cies and the social level of legitimacy. In this work, regulation legitimacy was
adopted as an index of the policy of promotion and diffusion of legality. The
simulation results showed a strong causal dependence between social legitimacy
and the irregularity ratio of the economy.
Starting from the benchmark levels for each area we increased the legitimacy
level of small percentage (+5%). The simulation data show that with just a small
increasing of legitimacy the irregularity ratio is reduced to nil. For all three areas
the increasing in legitimacy shows a very strong effect on the irregularity ratio
and low exit rates. It needed an increase of about 50% in the South, 25% in
the Centre and 20% in the North to wipe off entirely the irregularity in all the
areas. An interesting result about the aggregate output that has shown a quasi-
decreasing trend for more and more legitimacy. The following graphics 3 show
the results of the test.
graphic 3a - SOUTH -
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graphic 3b - CENTRE -
graphic 3c - NORTH
5 Conclusion
What is the best policy mix to enforce the irregularity? In this paper, the effects
of enforcement policies have been studied in a simulated underground economy.
Thi paper has two main themes. First, we study the incentives firms face to
choice regular or irregular sector. In particular, we study the role of enforcement
of regulation (in the form of inspections, punish and legitimacy) on the behavior
of firms. Second, we analyze how enforcement affects firm perfomance and their
exit rate to the market.
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In the one hand, high magnitude of punish level reduces the access of firms
to irregular sector but there will be high exit rates. The output shows a positive
dynamics. In the second hand, the control policy has shown negligible effects on
the irregular sector size, with a increasing exit rates. Furthermore, in all regions,
the increasing legitimacy level produces a very good effect on the irregularity
with low exit rates, but the aggragate output did show a quasi-negative trend.
Too much legality is not good for the social welfare!
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